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More on Moore: A Novel Strategy for 
Compensating the Human Sources of 
Patentable Cell-Line Inventions Based 
on Existing Law 
Christopher Scott Pennisi* 
 
In 1986, Clonetics Corporation introduced the 
first commercial product containing live human skin 
cells.1  The “EpiPack” provides normal human 
epidermal cells, grown in the laboratory, in a 
unique growth medium, enabling researchers to 
quickly screen the reaction of human skin cells to 
“drugs for diseases such as cancer, chemicals like 
pesticides, a variety of cosmetics or even biological 
warfare agents.”2  Such an invention allows 
pharmaceutical, cosmetic and medical researchers 
to test products without using animals or other, less 
accurate, biological models.3  The EpiPack was 
created from human skin samples purchased from 
doctors and patients following elective plastic 
surgery.4 
INTRODUCTION 
Cells are the basic structural unit of living animals and plants.5  
Cells are self-regulating entities containing miniature organs 
 
 *  Princeton University, B.A., 1996; New York University, M.S., 1998; Fordham 
University J.D. 2001.  The author would like to thank Megan O’Connor for all her 
support and editorial assistance.  N.B.: this note was entered in the 2001 International 
Intellectual Property Society Competition. 
 1 See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS 
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, at 24 (1987) [hereinafter 
OTA REPORT], available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/ns20/alpha_f.html (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2001); see also Rex Dalton, Cloned Human Skin Cells Go On The Market, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 15, 1987 at B1. 
 2 See Dalton, supra note 1, at B1. 
 3 See id. 
 4 See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 24. 
 5 See id. at 5. 
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(organelles) surrounded by a living membrane filled with liquid 
(cytoplasm).6  Cells can be specialized or “differentiated” for a 
variety of functions, including the manufacture or digestion of 
compounds, photosynthesis, and antibody production, among 
others.7  Scientists and medical researchers often study the various 
functions of an organism by examining isolated cells.8  This is an 
essential technique for the development of biotechnology.9  Before 
they can be studied, however, cells must be removed from a body, 
isolated and cultured on a medium.10  These cell cultures are 
known as “cell-lines” because they come from, and give rise to, 
other cells along a similar hereditary lineage.11  Due to the relative 
difficulty of developing and growing a cell-line in a laboratory 
from a human cell sample, the process is considered an art form.12  
Once developed, cell-lines can be used for diagnostic, therapeutic, 
research and commercial purposes or any combination thereof.13 
Research uses for human tissue generally focus on expanding the 
depth of biological research through study of the characteristics 
and functions of organs, tissues, and cells.14  Commercial 
development stems from this scientific or basic research.15  
Commercial usage of cell-lines focuses on developing products for 
further scientific research or medical treatment purposes.16  In 
product-oriented contexts, random specimens of human tissue can 
be used in one-time processes to create or test products and can 
then be discarded — as cells in an EpiPack are intended to be used.  
 
 6 See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5; See MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 5-9 (Harvey 
Lodish et al. eds., 3d ed. 1995). 
 7 See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 31 (noting that cells are specialized, or 
differentiated, to perform specific functions). 
 8 See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. 
 9 See id. at 5. 
 10 See id. at 5, 32. 
 11 For example, epithelial cells can give rise to genetically similar epithelial cells.  
See MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY, supra note 6, at 196; see also OTA REPORT, supra note 
1, at 3 (defining a “cell-line” as “a sample of cells, having undergone the process of 
adaptation to artificial laboratory cultivation, that is now capable of sustaining 
continuous, long-term growth in culture”). 
 12 See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that establishing a successful human 
cell culture from a given sample of tissue varies in probability between .01 percent for 
some liver cells and 100 percent for skin cells). 
 13 Annie O. Wu, Note, Surpassing the Material: The Human Rights Implications of 
Informed Consent in Bioprospecting Cells Derived From Indigenous People Groups, 78 
WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 986-87 (2000) (describing the utility of cell-lines). 
 14 See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. 
 15 See id. at 8. 
 16 See id. 
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Alternatively, tissue specimens with particular properties might be 
sought out and made part of long term research, investigating 
specific scientific questions or producing particular products, like 
cells used to create cell-lines.  The potential for economic gain 
from commercialization of cell-lines, while sometimes great, is 
difficult to predict during the cell-lines’ development.17  Without 
human biological samples, the biotechnology industry would have 
great difficulty producing and testing the drugs, devices, and other 
products that it develops in an effort to improve medical care and 
the general quality of human life.18  Despite its noble purpose, the 
biotechnology industry is motivated in part by profit.19  The 
expansion and diversification of the industry raises many ethical 
questions regarding ownership in human-derived tissue and cells 
used in the production of commercially successful cell-lines.20  
These questions were thrust into the legal limelight by the seminal 
California Supreme Court case of Moore v. The Regents of the 
University of California.21  The court, in a conservative opinion, 
refused to extend any ownership rights in a cell-line invention to 
its human source.22  Due in part to the moral backlash over the 
court’s rejection of any such ownership rights, the question of 
property rights to profitable cells will undoubtedly be revisited by 
future courts. 
This Note analyzes the law and policies surrounding the denial 
of property rights to the human sources of cell-line inventions as 
 
 17 As with all commercial products, for a cell-line to be profitable there must be a 
demand for the product.  Demand for cell-lines is tied to the type of research the line 
facilitates.  Because it is difficult to predict what the scientific community will focus on 
in terms of research, it is difficult to predict whether a cell-line will be “in demand,” and 
thus profitable. 
 18 “Currently, researchers testing drugs or chemicals use hard-to-obtain cadaver skin, 
hairless animals and . . . humans.  Each of these test modes has its own faults – even 
humans, whose bathing habits can distort results.”  Dalton, supra note 1.  It is believed 
that lab-grown skin cells may be “a more exact, efficient and less costly method of testing 
drugs . . . .”  Id. 
 19 See, e.g., id. (For example, in the context of epidermal cell-lines there is “intense 
competition in the growing tissue-cloning field – where investors are staking millions of 
dollars on the technology of individual firms.”); see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that “[i]t has been suggested 
by writers that biotechnology is no longer a purely research oriented field [and that] 
links . . . between academics and industry to profitize biological specimens are a subject 
of great concern”). 
 20 See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. 
 21 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 22 See id. at 480. 
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highlighted by Moore v. The Regents of the University of 
California.23  It suggests a novel solution to the dilemma of 
human-source rights that would adequately recompense the source 
of a cell-line invention for his contribution.  It argues that a right to 
compensation can be asserted under existing elements of patent 
law by applying the decades old shop right doctrine.  It then argues 
that the most effective means of administering this relationship is 
to alter standard informed consent documents for medical 
procedures so that a patient does not release all interest in 
inventions resulting from his tissue merely by consenting to the 
procedure.  By drawing on existing elements of patent and contract 
law, this solution requires no legislative effort and avoids many of 
the pitfalls of simply paying sources for tissue samples before the 
true value of their cells is known.  Part I of the paper provides the 
factual background of the Moore case.  Part II critiques the 
California Supreme Court’s reasoning in refusing to allow Moore 
to recover against his physician and the University of California at 
Los Angeles (“UCLA”) Medical Center.  Part III discusses 
whether medical patients should retain rights in their potentially 
valuable excised tissue cell-line inventions.  Finally, Part IV 
presents an efficient system for managing a patient’s hypothetical 
right to share in the commercial exploitation of his tissue within 
the existing body of law. 
I.  IS IT ETHICAL TO COMMERCIALIZE PRODUCTS BASED ON 
HUMAN-DERIVED CELL SAMPLES INDEPENDENT OF CONSENT FROM 
THE SOURCE? 
A.  Moore v. The Regents of The University of California  
John Moore first visited UCLA Medical Center (operated by the 
Regents of the University of California (the “Regents”)) on 
October 5, 1976, shortly after he learned that he had hairy-cell 
leukemia, a rare type of cancer.24  Moore was admitted to the 
 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 481.  See generally Arnold S. Freedman & Lee M. Nadler, Malignancies Of 
Lymphoid Cells, available at http://www.harrisonsonline.com (last visited April 27, 
2000) (explaining that hairy cell leukemia is a rare type of cancer occurring 
predominantly in males over age 40 with expression of specific adhesion molecules 
involved in localizing cells to the spleen and marrow as well as massive splenomegaley, 
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hospital and had blood, bone marrow aspirate, and other bodily 
substances taken from him by attending physician Dr. David W. 
Golde, who confirmed Moore’s diagnosis.25  Golde was “aware 
that certain blood products and blood components were of great 
value in a number of commercial and scientific efforts and that 
access to a patient whose blood contained these substances would 
provide competitive, commercial, and scientific advantages.”26  
Three days later, Golde recommended that Moore’s spleen be 
removed, and informed Moore that he “‘had reason to fear for his 
life, and that the proposed splenectomy operation . . . was 
necessary to slow down the progress of his disease.’”27  Prior to the 
splenectomy, Golde and Shirley G. Quan, a researcher employed 
by the Regents, made arrangements to obtain portions of Moore’s 
spleen after it was removed, for research purposes unrelated to 
Moore’s medical care.28  Golde gave written instructions to this 
effect on October 18 and 19, 1976.29  Moore’s spleen was removed 
on October 20, although he was not informed of what subsequently 
happened to it.30 
Moore returned to UCLA Medical Center several times between 
November 1976 and September 1983 pursuant to Golde’s 
“representations ‘that such visits were necessary and required for 
[Moore’s] health and well-being, and based upon the trust inherent 
in and by virtue of the physician-patient relationship . . . .’”31  
Moore traveled to UCLA Medical Center where Golde removed 
samples of Moore’s blood, blood serum, skin, bone-marrow 
aspirate, and sperm.32  Moore was advised that “the procedures 
were to be performed only [at UCLA Medical Center] and only 
under Golde’s direction.”33  Golde ultimately realized significant 
financial gain through his exclusive access to Moore’s cells.34 
 
 
where the spleen extends greater than 8 cm below the lowest rib on the left side and/or 
weighs more than 1,000g). 
 25 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481. 
 26 Id. at 481 (citation omitted in original). 
 27 Id. (ellipsis in original) (citation omitted). 
 28 See id. 
 29 See id. 
 30 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481. 
 31 Id. (citation omitted). 
 32 See id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. 
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Throughout the period of time that Moore was being treated by 
Golde, Golde conducted research on Moore’s unique cells.35  
Although the commercial potential of cells is difficult to predict at 
the outset of research, “‘competing commercial firms 
in . . . relevant fields have . . . predict[ed] a potential market of 
approximately $3.01 Billion Dollars by the year 1990 for [such 
cells].’”36  As a result, when Golde ultimately developed a cell-line 
from Moore’s T-lymphocytes,37 he and Quan applied for and were 
issued a patent for that line, with the Regents of the State of 
California named as its assignees.38  Pursuant to the established 
policy, the Regents, Golde, and Quan were to share in any profits 
arising from the patent and, with the Regents’ assistance, Golde 
negotiated contracts for commercial development of the cell-line 
and derivative products.39  Under one such agreement, Golde 
became a consultant to Genetics Institute, acquired 75,000 shares 
of stock, and was to be paid $330,000 over three years in exchange 
for exclusive access to the materials and research performed on the 
“Mo” cell-line and products derived from it.40  Sandoz 
Pharmaceuticals41 was “‘added to the agreement,’ and 
compensation payable to Golde and the Regents was increased by 
$110,000.”42 
As a result of Golde’s failure to disclose his preexisting research 
and economic interests in Moore’s unique cells prior to performing 
any invasive procedures, Moore named Dr. Golde, Shirley Quan, 
the Regents, Genetics Institute, and Sandoz as defendants in a 
lawsuit stating thirteen causes of action.43  The trial court, 
 
 35 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481. 
 36 Id. at 482 (citation omitted in original). 
 37 Golde initially named the cell-line “Mo” after Moore, but later renamed it to 
conceal the connection between patient and profit.  See Charles E. Lipsey et al., 
Protecting Trade Secrets In Biotechnology, 224 PRACTICING L. INST. 807, 915 (1986). 
 38 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481-82. 
 39 See id. at 482. 
 40 See id. 
 41 In April, 1996, following a corporate merger with Ciba, Sandoz became part of 
Novartis Pharma.  See Strong Swiss Franc Mars Ciba/Sandoz Results Will Merge With 
Sandoz to Form Novartis in Move That Has Been Approved by Shareholders, EUR. 
CHEMICAL NEWS, Apr. 29, 1996, at 19. 
 42 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 482 (citation omitted in original). 
 43 The causes of action were 1) conversion; 2) lack of informed consent; 3) breach of 
fiduciary duty; 4) fraud and deceit; 5) unjust enrichment; 6) quasi-contract; 7) bad faith 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 8) intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; 9) negligent misrepresentation; 10) intentional interference with 
prospective advantageous economic relationships; 11) slander of title; 12) accounting; 
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however, considered only the first, conversion, and sustained a 
general demurrer on the remaining actions.44  Moore claimed that 
he had a property interest in his own cells which extended beyond 
their removal from his body, and that the defendants’ conduct 
constituted a substantial interference in his right of possession of 
those cells.45  Moore further argued that, despite his execution of a 
general waiver of rights to his cells, he had never authorized the 
use of his cells for research and that Golde’s usage constituted 
conversion.46  Under California state law, conversion is a strict 
liability tort requiring proof that the property allegedly converted is 
personal property, and that the conversion itself resulted in 
damages.47 
The trial court sustained the defendant’s demurrers to the 
conversion allegation on the grounds that Moore failed to 
specifically allege that he did not know that tissues removed during 
his treatment at UCLA might be used for research as well as for his 
personal medical treatment.48  Although the Superior Court gave 
Moore leave to amend his original complaint, he appealed to the 
California Court of Appeals instead.49  The Court of Appeals 
reversed the dismissals of the trial court and concluded that 
Moore’s claim of a property interest in his own excised tissues did 
not lack basis in legal authority, public policy or scientific fact.50  
Further, the court found that Moore had sufficiently stated an 
action for conversion.51 
 
and 13) declaratory relief.  See id. at 482 n.4. 
 44 See id. at 482-83. 
 45 See id. at 487. 
 46 See Maureen S. Dorney, Moore v. The Regents of the University of California: 
Balancing the Need for Biotechnology Innovation Against the Right of Informed Consent, 
5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 333, 340 (1990) (“The consent form included a portion where the 
individual was to circle either ‘I do’, or ‘I do not’ ‘voluntarily grant to the University of 
California any and all rights I, or my heirs, may have in any cell-line or any other 
potential product which might be developed from the blood and/or bone marrow obtained 
from me.’”). 
 47 See Poggi v. Scott, 139 P. 815, 816 (Cal. 1914) (“The foundation for the action of 
conversion rests neither in the knowledge nor the intent of the defendant. It rests upon the 
unwarranted interference by defendant with the dominion over the property of the 
plaintiff from which injury to the latter results. Therefore neither good nor bad faith, 
neither care nor negligence, neither knowledge nor ignorance, are of the gist of the 
action.”). 
 48 See Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 502. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See id. at 503-506. 
 51 See id. at 511. 
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The Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeals, 
finding that Moore was not entitled to share in the profits from the 
cell-line, because it was legally and factually distinct from Moore’s 
cells.52  With respect to the issue of informed consent, the 
California Supreme Court analyzed Moore’s cause of action under 
three well established principles.  These were, “[f]irst, ‘a person of 
adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of 
control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit 
to lawful medical treatment’ . . . [s]econd, ‘the patient’s consent to 
treatment, to be effective, must be an informed consent’ . . . [t]hird, 
in soliciting the patient’s consent, a physician has a fiduciary duty 
to disclose all information material to the patient’s decision.” 53  
Specifically, the court concluded that: 
1) a physician must disclose personal interests 
unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or 
economic, that may affect the physician’s 
professional judgment; and 2) a physician’s failure 
to disclose such interests may give rise to a cause of 
action for performing medical procedures without 
informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty.54 
Not surprisingly, the court held that the sufficiency of such 
disclosures must be measured from the patient’s perspective.55 
The California Supreme Court held that Moore’s assertion that 
Golde concealed an economic interest in the postoperative 
procedures gave rise to a legitimate breach of fiduciary duty, 
regardless of the fact that the splenectomy had some therapeutic 
value.56  Because the Regents, Quan, Genetics Institute and Sandoz 
were not physicians, much less Moore’s physician, none of these 
defendants were held liable for breach of fiduciary duty as they 
had no responsibility for obtaining Moore’s informed consent.57  
Although the court did find that Golde breached the principles of 
informed consent law by failing to inform Moore of his research 
 
 52 The court felt that because the cell-line is the product of an inventive effort, it was 
a entity distinct from Moore’s original cells and that this therefore extinguished Moore’s 
rights.  See Moore, 793 P.2d at 492-493. 
 53 See id. at 483 (citations omitted). 
 54 Id. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 485. 
 57 See id. at 486. 
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interest,58 it did not specifically discuss whether informed consent 
must address research performed on human tissue after it is excised 
from the body.59  The court did not have to address this issue, 
because it could settle the underlying monetary dispute based on 
well-settled principles of informed consent rather than 
incorporating non-legal impressions of patients’ rights into the 
common law.60  By basing its decision on informed consent, the 
court was able to ground its reasoning in the more germane tort of 
performing unauthorized procedures on a patient rather than 
addressing the esoteric problem of who owns cell-lines.61  
Informed consent law gives research subjects a right to determine 
whether research is performed on them, but not an interest in that 
research once they have consented to it.62  Because the research 
had not been consented to, the court did not look beyond the 
informed consent cause of action to the deeper question posed by 
Moore, namely, whether the human source of a cell-based 
invention should retain rights in the tissue co-opted by the 
inventors, including the right to profit from it. 
II. WHO SHOULD DERIVE FINANCIAL BENEFIT FROM THE SALE OF 
PATENTED CELL-LINES? 
Moore’s conversion cause of action was rejected by the 
California Supreme Court because Moore failed to establish a 
property interest in his spleen after it was removed.63  The court 
held inter alia that “[s]ince Moore clearly did not expect to retain 
possession of his cells following their removal, to sue for their 
conversion he must have retained an ownership interest in them.  
 
 58 See id. at 485 (finding that Moore adequately alleged that Golde had an 
“undisclosed research interest in Moore’s cells at the time he sought Moore’s consent to 
the splenectomy”). 
 59 See id. at 483-87. 
 60 See id. at 483-97.  The court found that Moore sufficiently alleged a cause of 
action for “breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to the patient’s consent.”  
Id. at 483.  The court, however, declined to extend conversion liability to encompass 
Moore’s situation, believing that “problems in this area are better suited to legislative 
resolution.”  Id. at 493. 
 61 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 483-97. 
 62 See Dorney, supra note 46, at 361 (commenting that while there are federal 
guidelines on informed consent, they were drafted to protect people from the dangers of 
physical and mental experimentation rather than commercial development of excised 
tissue). 
 63 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 487-93. 
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But there are several reasons to doubt that he did retain any such 
interest.”64  The court cited three fundamental reasons for rejecting 
Moore’s claim to a property interest in his spleen cells: 1) no court 
had previously found that a person had a common law property 
interest in their cells; 2) analogous statutory law in California 
limited patients’ control over their excised cells;65 and 3) the 
patented Mo cell-line was factually and legally distinct from the 
original cells taken from Moore.66  The court also concluded that, 
contrary to public policy, the existence of such a right would enact 
a significant barrier to efficient medical research.67  The majority 
did not take a firm position on whether property interest in bodily 
organs could ever arise.68 
The California Supreme Court relied on the premise that rights 
not embodied within a statute do not exist and that therefore, 
Moore lacked a right under California law in excised human 
cells.69  The court looked to the California Health and Safety Code 
for the source of any such right in tissue and identified § 7054.4, 
concerned primarily with disposal of human products used in 
research,70 as the most relevant statute to the determination of 
property rights in excised cells.71  According to the court: 
 
 64 See id. at 488-89. 
 65 The court was referring to California Health and Safety Code § 7054.4, concerned 
primarily with disposal of human products used in research.  See discussion infra pp. 756-
58. 
 66 See Human Cells and Tissue for Sale (A Caveat) – Did you Advise Your Patient or 
Client of His Commercial Rights?, 62 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 199, 201 (1991) (explaining that 
California statutes governing analogous subjects such as human tissue, corneal tissue and 
dead bodies demonstrated to the Moore court that the California legislature had chosen to 
regulate the disposition of these items by specialized statute and not through judicial 
expansion of tort law). 
 67 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 487. 
 68 See id. at 488-89.  See also Judith B. Prowda, Moore v. The Regents of the 
University of California: An Ethical Debate on Informed Consent and Property Rights in 
a Patient’s Cells, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 611, 617 (1995). 
 69 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 491-92 (stating that the statute’s practical effect is to 
drastically limit a patient’s control over his excised cells, eliminating “so many of the 
rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot simply assume that what is left 
amounts to ‘property’ or ‘ownership’ for purposes of conversion law”). 
 70 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 7054.4, Human remains following conclusion of 
scientific use; disposal (2000). 
 71 The court cited the following excerpt from the statute in support of its choice: 
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, recognizable anatomical parts, human 
tissues, anatomical human remains, or infectious waste following conclusion of scientific 
use shall be disposed of by interment, incineration, or any other method determined by 
the state department [of health services] to protect the public health and safety.”  See 
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[O]ne cannot escape the conclusion that the 
statute’s practical effect is to limit, drastically, a 
patient’s control over excised cells.  By restricting 
how excised cells may be used and requiring their 
eventual destruction, the statute eliminates so many 
of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one 
cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to 
‘property’ or ‘ownership’ for the purposes of 
conversion law.72 
Paradoxically, the court acknowledged that “the Legislature did 
not specifically intend this statute to resolve the question of 
whether a patient is entitled to compensation for the nonconsensual 
use of excised cells.”73  As a result, it is difficult to understand 
exactly how the court relied on this statute for anything other than 
what its plain language identifies as its purpose, the proper 
disposal of potentially infectious human tissue.74  Furthermore, the 
court failed to explain why this statute extinguishes a source’s 
rights in their tissue once it is separated from the body, yet 
supports the conclusion that an invention in these cells becomes 
the property of researchers without an explicit statutorily created 
right.75  It is axiomatic that individuals own the cells currently 
growing within their bodies much as they own the whole body.  
Although a patient may consent to the removal of some of those 
cells for medical treatment, or even research purposes, it is 
intuitive that at some point any consent to such procedures lapses 
or expires, and that without the renewed consent by the source, the 
removed cells should be disposed of.  California Health and Safety 
 
Moore, 793 P.2d at 491 (alterations in original). 
 72 Id. at 491-92. 
 73 Id. at 491. 
 74 See Cal. Health and Safety Code § 7054.4, Human remains following conclusion 
of scientific use; disposal (2000). 
 75 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 491-92.  The court offers only a weak economic argument 
in support of this illogical conclusion.  See id. at 495-96. 
The theory of liability that Moore urges us to endorse threatens to 
destroy the economic incentive to conduct important medical 
research.  If the use of cells in research is a conversion, then with 
every cell sample a researcher purchases a ticket in a litigation 
lottery.  Because liability for conversion is predicated on a continuing 
ownership interest, “companies are unlikely to invest heavily in 
developing, manufacturing, or marketing a product when uncertainty 
about clear title exists.” 
Id. (quoting OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 27). 
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Code § 7054.4 merely codified this expectation.76 
The court mistakenly equated possession of tissue with retention 
of rights in the tissue, and thus its entire reasoning on the issue of 
property rights in cell-lines is suspect.  Moreover, the court did not 
provide any reasoning to buttress its conclusion that Moore had no 
property interest in his tissue because the court confused the issue 
of ownership with the issue of determination.77  Ultimately, 
however, the question not posed by the court is more relevant than 
the issues the court did address.  The court did not address why 
there is no common law or statutory property right in one’s own 
tissue independent of whether that tissue is in the actual possession 
of its former host.  In requiring consent for research to be 
performed upon excised tissue, Health and Safety Code § 24175 
implies that such a right exists,78 yet the Moore court affirmatively 
declared that it does not.79 
 
 76 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 7054.4 (2000) (legislating the disposal of tissue at 
the conclusion of scientific use). 
 77 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 488-97.  The Moore court stated, in part, “[s]ince Moore 
clearly did not expect to retain possession of his cells following their removal, to sue for 
their conversion he must have retained an ownership interest in them.”  See id. at 488-87.  
In so stating, the court completely ignored the possibility that Moore had, in granting 
limited consent for research purposes, retained the right to determine the use of his tissue, 
but not to demand that the tissues be returned.  Thus, it confused his claim of right to 
determine the use of his tissue with his right to continued possession of it.  This concept 
is analogous to a copyright, wherein the artist creating a work remains the creator 
regardless of who owns the rights to profit from the work.  Although the artist cannot 
demand the return of his work from the owner of the performance right, it is axiomatic 
that he retains the ability to institute legal action against pirates who use his creation 
without permission. 
 78 See Cal. Health and Safety Code § 24175, Medical experiments; informed consent 
(2000).  The statue states, in part, that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, no 
person shall be subjected to any medical experiment unless the informed consent of such 
person is obtained.”  See id.  The California Supreme Court in Moore did acknowledge 
that “a physician who is seeking a patient’s consent for a medical procedure must, in 
order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient’s informed consent, disclose 
personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or economic, that 
may affect his medical judgment.”  Moore, 793 P.2d at 485.  The Moore court, however, 
did not extend this idea of consent to the granting of property rights in excised cells, 
stating that this right to consent is a “limited right to control the use of excised cells” 
which may still exist despite the fact that California Health and Safety Code §7054.4 
eliminates “so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot simply 
assume that what is left amounts to ‘property.’”  See id. at 491-92. 
 79 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 491-92 (stating that California Health and Safety Code 
§7054.4 eliminates “so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot 
simply assume that what is left amounts to ‘property’”); see also id. at 503 (dissent) 
(refuting the majority’s reliance on section 7054.4 in determining that no property right in 
excised body cells exists). 
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III.  SHOULD PEOPLE HAVE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THEIR DISCARDED 
TISSUE? 
Until recently, blood drawn for medical testing was considered 
useless after the test was performed.80  Today, however, we have 
reached an age in medicine where what was once waste is now a 
valuable commodity.81  Yet, the legal view of these once-discarded 
tissues and fluids has not changed to reflect their new value.  As 
Moore’s failed conversion cause of action demonstrates, we do not 
recognize rights in what is voluntarily removed from our bodies.82  
This has created a paradoxical duality whereby researchers can 
claim patients’ tissue as their own, base an invention around the 
tissue, commercialize it, then exclude the human source from any 
benefits realized.  What is created is undoubtedly due in part to the 
contribution of the source, but the source cannot enforce any claim 
to part-ownership because he lacks a property interest in his 
excised cells or tissue.83  If property rights in one’s excised tissue 
were recognized, a patient would be empowered with the myriad 
causes of action available in property and tort for any injury to, 
taking of, or unauthorized use of their “property.”84  It would also 
enable the holder to grant rights of usage to others via sale, lease, 
license or any legal device used to transfer interests in real 
property in whole or in part to another person or entity, and thus 
demand compensation for a role in the production of a cell-line 
invention.85  At present, however, the only property rights 
recognized in the human body are limited to personal use, sale of a 
few of its products, and transferability of cadavers following 
death.86 
 
 80 See Prowda, supra note 68, at 612. 
 81 See id. at 612 (noting that “as the field of biotechnology has expanded, human 
body components . . . have acquired real monetary value”). 
 82 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 487-97. 
 83 See, e.g., id. (denying Moore’s cause of action in conversion and claim of a 
proprietary interest in each of the products created from his cells). 
 84 For example: conversion, replevin, adverse possession, unjust enrichment, and 
misappropriation.  See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §§ 15, 130 at 1020 (W. Page 
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (conversion, misappropriation); Jim’s Furniture Mart, Inc. v. 
Harris, 356 N.E.2d 175, 176 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (replevin); ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET 
AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.7, (1984) (adverse possession); Tulalip Shores, Inc. v. 
Mortland, 511 P.2d 1402, 1404 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (unjust enrichment). 
 85 See, e.g., RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 189-208 (3d 
ed. 1975). 
 86 See Hannah Horsley, Reconsidering Inalienability for Commercially Valuable 
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Three justifications are proffered for the failure to acknowledge 
any further property rights in the human body: 1) selling the 
human body is rightly eschewed as an immoral infringement on the 
sanctity of personhood; 2) the marketing of the human body would 
lead to exploitation of the poor and ignorant; and 3) the individual 
products of the human body have no inherent value once the host is 
finished using them and thus cannot be exchanged for valuable 
consideration.87  As further explored below, none of these three 
justifications has any substantial foundation in law or even logic, 
and thus fail to bolster the argument for limited property rights in 
the products of one’s body.  Given the failure of these traditional 
justifications, it follows that plaintiffs such as Moore might have 
legitimate recourse to claim compensation for their role in 
producing a profitable cell-line invention. 
The most common argument against the recognition of property 
rights in anything less than the totality of one’s body is that this 
would “result in the commodification of the person and violate 
notions of human dignity and personhood.”88  While this argument 
holds true when considering essential and unique parts of the 
human body, such as limbs, it is hard to support the notion that 
regenerating body products, such as blood, cells, or tumors, are 
part of anyone’s personhood.89  If these body products are not 
central to personhood, the removal and subsequent sale of such 
products cannot diminish human dignity so long as their sale or 
removal is not forced or required.90 
Unfortunately, the sale of scientifically or commercially 
valuable products of the human body is severely restricted under 
 
Biological Materials, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 223, 230 (1992) (“A few [body parts] may 
be sold (e.g. blood, semen, hair), but the majority may only be given away (i.e. [organs 
and tissues and other scientifically and commercially valuable] biological materials).”). 
 87 See Horsley, supra note 86, at 239; Roy Hardiman, Toward the Right of 
Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 
34 UCLA L. REV. 207, 237 (1986); Prowda, supra note 68, at 612. 
 88 Horsley, supra note 86, at 230 (“Personhood” is used to represent the notion that 
the metaphysical characteristics of the “person” and the physical body are so interrelated 
as to be one in the same.  Thus, that respect for the inalienability of persons includes 
similar respect for the body.). 
 89 See id. at 232.  Indeed, the sale of blood was fully accepted by society prior to the 
spread of deadly and difficult-to-detect blood borne pathogens such as H.I.V. 
 90 Perhaps the real loss of dignity lies in the idea that the sale of body products is a 
derivative form of prostitution.  But this argument carries little weight in light of the goal 
of the exchange – the contribution to the expansion of scientific knowledge. 
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the National Organ Transplant Act (“N.O.T.A.”).91  The 
restrictions under N.O.T.A. are based on the “commodification” 
justification and an anxiety over the potential market consequences 
of permitting such sales.92  The N.O.T.A. precludes the sale of 
organs out of a fear that allowing such sale would give rise to a 
black market in organs that would coexist with any legal one.93  
But, as this ban applies equally to non-traditional “organs,” such as 
cells and other replenishing tissue, and traditional organs, 
N.O.T.A. is overbroad in that it fails to take into consideration the 
fact that some “organ” sales do not present any danger of 
sustaining black market trade.94 
Upon first impression, it might seem that the sale of body 
products, like the sale of whole bodily organs, would lead to 
coercion of the poor or ignorant into such sales by unscrupulous 
organ traders motivated only by profit.95  Theoretically, the denial 
 
 91 See National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 
(1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  N.O.T.A. makes it 
“unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human 
organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects 
interstate commerce.”  42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1991).  Although § 274e encompasses cells, 
blood and other bodily tissue, it does not explicitly restrict the sale of these materials, and 
has never been read to do so.  See Helen R. Bergman, Rationing Health Care: Social, 
Political and Legal Perspectives: Note and Comment: Case Comment: Moore v. Regents 
of the University of California, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 127, 143 (1992). 
 92 See Horsley, supra note 86, at 230.  Congress identified the intent of such 
legislation prohibiting the buying and selling of human organs as “directed at preventing 
the for-profit marketing of kidneys and other organs.”  S. Rep. No. 98-382 (1984), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3978. 
 93 See Horsley, supra note 86, at 230; S. Rep. No. 98-382 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3978. 
 94 So-called “black market organ sales” only concern vital organs that have 
immediate present value for re-transplantation purposes, such as livers, hearts and 
kidneys.  In precluding their transfer for valuable consideration, the N.O.T.A. achieves 
the laudable legislative aim of avoiding a wealth of problems that might result from the 
emergence of a black market in transplantable organs.  But, some “organs” under the 
N.O.T.A., such as blood, stem cells, or excised tumors, have no present value except as 
material for research.  As raw material for research, these “organs” have only potential, 
intangible, and uncertain value, which renders their black market worth zero.  Therefore, 
legal recognition of their sale by medical patients to researchers presents none of the risks 
that recognition of vital organ sales would. 
 95 See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Human Flourishing and Limits on Markets, 95 MICH. 
L. REV. 2139, 2140 (1997) (noting that extending markets to body parts “threatens to 
exploit poor and vulnerable persons”); Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: 
Protection of Society’s Most Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Organ 
Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 74-75 (1995) (noting that the World 
Health Assembly’s 1991 resolution regarding organ donation recognized “the possible 
abuse, coercion, and undue influence involved with live organ donors”). 
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of property rights and the bar on any sales of organs would prevent 
such situations by removing the profitability of exploitation.  This 
view fails to take into account the fact that biological materials 
(other than discrete organs) with commercial value are rare, most 
often discovered because they are malignant enough to require 
their removal.96  It also fails to acknowledge the fundamental 
difference between “before-the-fact incentive for acquiescence in 
organ removal” and after-the-fact “participat[ion] in profits derived 
from tissue already removed.”97  In fact, it can be argued that the 
failure to sanction sales in some circumstances does not eliminate 
the possibility of unscrupulous conduct, but merely shifts it from 
organ brokers to researchers seeking to exploit body products for 
commercial profits.98  Additionally, despite the N.O.T.A.’s all-
encompassing ban on organ sales from source to buyer, 
commercialization of bodily tissue has already occurred to a large 
extent via third party transfers between for-profit biomedical 
entities and research laboratories.99  Therefore, prohibiting 
individuals from selling their own body products serves only to 
“defeat the individual’s right to profit from the commercial value 
of his or her own tissue, but not to defeat the commercial interest 
of the involved physician, investigator, university, or 
biotechnology companies.”100  Recognition of a patient’s right to 
market bodily material that is considered valuable by the medical 
research community would “ensure a fairer distribution of wealth 
between doctors and patients, comport with the legal protection of 
a patient’s autonomy, and preserve the trust the doctor-patient 
relationship that is threatened by the disparity in their rights to the 
 
 96 See Horsley, supra note 86 , at 237. 
 97 See Hardiman, supra note 87, at 239 (noting that “after-the-fact participation is 
morally supportable”). 
 98 The Moore case did not contain any indication of the monetary judgment Moore 
would have received as a result of Golde’s failure to disclose his own interests in 
Moore’s cells and thus his failure to obtain Moore’s fully informed consent to the 
splenectomy.  Even without the court’s pronouncement of a monetary judgment, 
however, we can conclude that Moore likely would have been awarded far less than the 
defendants would earn from marketing the cell-line.  Therefore, simple reasoning dictates 
that in any case where consent to research is denied, but the potential profit from 
commercialization of the subject’s body products might exceed the potential judgment 
resulting from a action for breach of informed consent, conducting the research in 
defiance of the subject’s wishes is economically justifiable. 
 99 See Hardiman, supra note 87, at 241. 
 100 Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, Biotechnology and the Commercial Use of 
Human Cells: Toward an Organic View of Life and Technology, 5 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 211, 247-48 (1989). 
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profits of commercialization.”101 
The right to sell scientifically and commercially valuable 
biological products would “re-establish the trust necessary to the 
interaction between physician and patient”102 as well as “allowing 
[the] patient to enter the market that already exists in her 
commercially valuable materials.”103  Presently, debate over such 
sales focuses on three principal areas: 1) the equity of production 
and distribution; 2) the added costs of payments to sources and the 
transaction costs associated with that process; and 3) the value of 
altruism in the donation of human biological materials.104  While 
there are meritorious arguments against allowing tissue sales,105 
they are outweighed by others in favor of compensating the source 
of a cell-line that proves to be commercially successful.  The 
primary argument against paying sources of biological materials is 
that biological materials have no inherent value in their 
“preinvention” state.106  It is further argued that even if these 
materials do have some value, it is outweighed by the harmful 
physical impact if retained within the body.107  Finally, this line of 
reasoning concludes that because the human sources do not 
contribute to the inventive process that confers measurable 
commercial value on their tissue, they should be excluded from 
realized profits.108  This line of reasoning is both unfair and short-
sighted with respect to the practical realities of such sales. 
When a replenishing tissue can no longer perform its prescribed 
function, it is valueless to its host organism from a biological 
perspective.  Similarly, diseased tissue may have a sizable negative 
value to its host, necessitating its removal at the earliest possible 
opportunity.109  Neither of these facts support the conclusion that 
 
 101 Horsley, supra note 86, at 235. 
 102 Id. at 238. 
 103 Id. at 242. 
 104 See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. 
 105 Arguments against legalizing tissue sales include higher costs for the scientific 
community (both transaction and actual costs in obtaining raw materials) and a longer 
development time for potentially lifesaving drugs. 
 106 See Thomas P. Dillon, Note, Source Compensation for Tissues and Cells Used in 
Biotechnical Research: Why a Source Shouldn’t Share in the Profits, 64 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 628, 641 (1989). 
 107 See id. 
 108 See id. 
 109 For example, the spread of tumors, gangrene, and localized infection can be 
substantially retarded or even halted through expeditious surgery to identify and remove 
the affected tissue, organ, or area. See, e.g., F. Bozzetti et al., Comparing Surgical 
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replenishing human tissue has no inherent monetary value once it 
has fulfilled its biological function.  Discovery of a new use for 
what was once considered waste has frequently conferred a new 
commercial life on that “waste.”110  For example, the need for cell 
samples for the production of cell-lines arguably gives rise to a 
new use and value for otherwise functionless parts of the human 
body, like Moore’s diseased spleen.  The rarer the cell type, the 
higher the value, assuming the sample is successfully converted 
into a viable and commercially successful cell-line.  Because 
particular donors, like Moore, are sought out and prized for the 
rarity of their cells, it is counterintuitive to assert that the cells are 
devoid of value prior to the efforts of a particular inventor.  This 
rarity is an inherent value even if the host cannot capitalize it.111 
Another factor that affects excised tissue’s worth is its source’s 
valuation of the private information this tissue contains.  Bodily 
tissues and substances are often inseparable from certain 
information about their source, including the existence of diseases 
and medical conditions,112 genetic markers for predisposition to 
others,113 and the full text of an individual’s chromosomes.114  
 
Resection of Limited Hepatic Metastases From Colorectal Cancer to Non-Operative 
Treatment, EUR. J. SURG. ONCOL. (1993) available at www.lexis.com. 
 110 For example, crop wastes that would otherwise be discarded at the end of a harvest 
can be sold to refineries for use in the production of ethanol for gasohol, a high-octane, 
clean-burning fuel for internal combustion engines.  See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GASOHOL: A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, at 3, 11, 47 (1979), 
available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/ns20/alpha_f.html (last visited Apr. 6, 
2001). 
 111 As the California Appellate Court pointed out in Moore, “[a] simple analogy 
illustrates the point: ‘Crude oil may be ruining a farmer’s corn crop.  The farmer may 
even be willing to pay an oil refinery company to take it off his land.  But, the farmer, 
who would be unable without the refinery’s aid to turn the crude oil into a usable 
commodity, is still entitled to a share of the refinery’s profits from his land’s product.’”  
249 Cal. Rptr. at 507 n.13 (citation omitted). 
 112 For example, genetic screening for cystic fibrosis, risk for breast cancer, 
Alzheimer’s disease, and many other genetic diseases is either currently available or 
under development. See Marilyn Chase, Genetic Testing Needs Clear Plans For How to 
Handle Treatment, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1996, at B1. 
 113 For example, the presence of genetic markers for a propensity to develop cancer.  
See, e.g., Joseph Palca, Keeping Genetic Information Under Wraps, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Mar. 13, 1997, at 6 (explaining that it is possible to evaluate a person’s risk for 
developing certain types of breast and ovarian cancer based on the presence of the 
BRCA1 gene). 
 114 Theoretically, possession of this information enables cloning via creation of a 
complete copy of an individual’s DNA, inserting it into a fertilized egg, and growing it as 
a “test tube” baby.  See Gina Kolata, Scientist Reports First Cloning Ever of Adult 
Mammal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997, at A1. 
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“Publication” of this genetic information might be undesirable, 
especially if express consent for such information transfer had not 
been secured.115  Thus, when contemplating rights in excised 
tissues, the potential for privacy invasion must be considered and 
the disclosure of genetic information bargained for by the source. 
Because bodily tissues have inherent value, it is fundamentally 
indefensible to assert that biotechnology, as a commercial industry, 
should be provided with its raw materials free of cost.116  Like any 
other property, biological materials should be transferable for 
valuable consideration, whether the consideration is in exchange 
for the tissue’s uniqueness or to compensate the source for his 
authorization of the publication of his private genetic information. 
Administrating such a system would interject significant 
transaction costs into the world of biological research if it were 
necessary to conduct a tissue “sale” every time a scientist wanted 
to undertake biological research.117  These costs would be 
justifiable only if there were some guarantee that the researcher 
would recoup his investment.  As the Moore court pointed out, this 
could stifle the progress of biomedical research.118  Fortunately, 
there is a more efficient system for administering such payments, 
one that would not place such a high burden on the entirety of 
biomedical research, but would focus particularly on compensating 
the sources of commercially successful cell-lines. 
 
 115 See Natalie Anne Stepanuk, Comment, Genetic Information And Third Party 
Access To Information: New Jersey’s Pioneering Legislation As A Model For Federal 
Privacy Protection Of Genetic Information, 47 CATH. U.L. REV. 1105, 1117-23 (1998). 
 116 This is similar to the California Court of Appeal’s argument in Moore.  The court 
notes that Biotechnology has become a science for profit, and “[b]iological materials no 
longer pass freely to all scientists.”  Thus, the court “fail[s] to see any justification for 
excluding the patient from participation in those profits.”  Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 509.  
The California Supreme Court disagreed, but the point remains a pertinent one. 
 117 These transaction costs include the actual cost of paying the source as well as the 
costs, both of time and effort, involved in contracting with the source for every intended 
use of the bodily material. 
 118 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 495. 
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IV. IF THE SOURCE OF A CELL-LINE HAS A RIGHT TO SHARE IN THE 
PROCEEDS OF COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF HIS TISSUE, IS THERE 
AN EFFICIENT SYSTEM FOR ENFORCING THAT RIGHT WITHIN THE 
EXISTING BODY OF LAW? 
The California Supreme Court’s rejection of the conversion 
cause of action was a conservative decision based in part on its 
unwillingness to make medical researchers strictly liable for any 
unauthorized taking of bodily tissue.119  In retrospect, the decision 
was an attempt to limit litigation over the profits of medical 
research.  Even though the ruling effectively limited meritless 
claims, it had the unfortunate side effect of eliminating legitimate 
claims like Moore’s.120  It need not have been so drastic. 
After determining that it did not want to extend tort law to 
Moore’s somewhat unique situation, the California Supreme Court 
should have more thoroughly examined other bodies of law for 
potential solutions to Moore’s alleged injury.  Intellectual property 
law was established for the precise purpose of assigning rights in 
the intangible financial capital of novel discovery, as well as 
rewarding individual contributions to the development of those 
discoveries.121  By statute, patents have attributes of personal 
property (albeit for limited periods of time) and the rights they 
confer may be assigned by written instrument.122  As a result, 
patent law contains possible solutions to the problem of the 
equitable division of rights in potentially lucrative inventions.  
There are two such elements of established patent law that could 
provide a solution for this issue: the shop rights doctrine123 and the 
preinvention contract.124  Both could have been adapted to address 
 
 119 See id. at 495-96 (“[T]he theory of liability that Moore urges us to endorse 
threatens to destroy the economic incentive to conduct important medical research.  If the 
use of cells in research is a conversion, then with every cell sample a researcher 
purchases a ticket in a litigation lottery.”).  Additionally, because liability for tortious 
conversion is predicated on a continuing ownership interest, “companies are unlikely to 
invest heavily in developing, manufacturing, or marketing a product when uncertainty 
about clear title exists.” See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 27. 
 120 The most significant marker of the legitimacy of Moore’s claim is that the Mo cell-
line was a commercially successful product derived wholly from Moore’s cells.  See 
Moore, 793 P.2d 479. 
 121 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 112-13 (1990). 
 122 See 35 U.S.C.S. § 261 (2000). 
 123 See infra pp. 767-73. 
 124 See infra pp. 773-77. 
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the taking Moore attempted to articulate in his complaint, while 
avoiding the potential problem of high transaction costs stifling the 
progress of medical research. 
A.  The Shop Right Doctrine 
Under the traditional shop right doctrine, when an employee 
makes and reduces to practice an invention on his employer’s time, 
using his employer’s resources, he implicitly grants the employer a 
limited, non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use (“practice”), 
make and sell that invention.125  This license continues for the 
entire duration of the patent, regardless of whether the inventor 
remains an employee.126  This right passes automatically, and may 
be transferred only if there is a complete succession of the entire 
business (including good will) of the shop right holder.127  The 
employee, as the patentee, retains all other aspects of the patent’s 
traditional right to exclude, including ownership, licensing and 
right to sue for infringement.128  The mere existence of an 
employment relationship does not suffice to create a shop right in 
an employer.129  The nature of the invention, the amount of 
employer resource contribution, and the nature of the employment 
all factor into a court’s determination of a shop right.130 
There are three classes of employee inventions based upon the 
subject matter of the invention and the resources the employer has 
contributed.  They are: 
1. Employer-Specified Inventions — those made at the 
employer’s request and expense; 
2. General Inventions — those made partly or wholly at the 
employer’s expense, but not specified by the employer; 
 
 125 See C.T. Dreschsler, Annotation, Application and Effect of “Shop Right Rule” or 
License Giving Employer Limited Rights in Employees’ Inventions and Discoveries, 61 
A.L.R.2D 356, § 4 (1958). 
 126 See Dreschsler, supra note 125, § 37; Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488, 494 
(5th Cir. 1967). 
 127 See Drechsler, supra note 125, § 36. 
 128 See Sandip H. Patel, Note, Graduate Students’ Ownership and Attribution Rights 
in Intellectual Property, 71 IND. L.J. 481, 493 (1996). 
 129 See Drechsler, supra note 125, § 5. 
 130 See Evelyn D. Pisegna-Cook, Ownership Rights of Employee Inventions: The Role 
of Preinvention Assignment Agreements and State Statutes, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
163, 169-70 (1994). 
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3. Private Inventions — those made on the employee’s own 
time, without the contribution of employer resources or other 
employees during working hours, unless it was specified by the 
employer.131 
At common law, the employer is entitled to ownership of 
employer-specified inventions regardless of a lack of preexisting 
contract to this effect.132  He is entitled to a shop right in general 
inventions, the extent of the right turning on the degree of the 
employer’s contribution in terms of labor and capital.133  As to 
private inventions, absent an agreement to the contrary, the 
employer is not entitled to any ownership.134 
If the doctor-patient relationship is viewed as a limited 
employer-employee relationship (with the doctor in the role of 
employee), then the shop right doctrine enables the patient to 
financially benefit from patents based on his tissue.  In a Moore-
like fact pattern, where a physician obtains a patent based on 
resources harvested from the patient,135 his employer, that patient 
should earn an enforceable shop right to use, make or sell the 
invention.  The shop right would vest based on the category of 
general inventions because the invention arose out of the 
employer-employee relationship.136  In order to maintain equity, 
the extent of the right should be limited by the degree of inventive 
effort required to transform the patient’s tissue into the patented 
invention, balanced against the rarity of the cells.137  In extreme 
cases, this could result in the patient having a very small or very 
large stake in the patent.  Generally, the resulting shop right would 
be a fairly limited one because it is highly unlikely that a physician 
invents a cell-line entirely on time paid for by the patient.  Nor is it 
likely that the physician would make use of any of the patient’s 
resources other than his tissue.  This is balanced against the fact 
that cell-lines (like Moore’s) are created almost exclusively out of 
cells from the patient-employer.  This model has two 
 
 131 See id. at 166-68; see also United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 
178 (1933). 
 132 See Drechsler, supra note 125, § 39. 
 133 See id. 
 134 See id. 
 135 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481-81. 
 136 See Pisegna-Cook, supra note 129, at 166 (defining General Inventions as “those 
made partly or wholly at the employer’s expense, but not specified by the employer”). 
 137 See id., at 169-70. 
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shortcomings.  First, no analog to usage of an employer’s tools or 
his physical plant exists in this hypothetical doctor-patient 
paradigm.  Second, the patient will not bear any of the financial 
risks of the inventive process. 
The nature of the doctor-patient relationship will likely undercut 
the scope of patient shop rights in cell-line inventions, but in 
today’s growing biotechnology market even a limited shop right in 
a patented cell-line is a potentially lucrative intellectual property 
holding.138  Regardless of its extent, however, the practical 
operation of such a right raises the question of what the average 
medical patient would do with a shop right in an invention which 
would have limited application outside the world of medicine.  
Although any shop right in a patient-derived medical invention 
would allow the patient-source to make and use the invention, 
these rights are meaningless if the patient lacks bio-engineering 
skills or experience.139  It would be an absurdity to allow the 
creation of a right on which a holder is unable to capitalize.  While 
the right to a cell-line invention is a powerful option for even the 
most unsophisticated holder of that right, the fact that these rights 
will be held by unsophisticated holders is also the fatal flaw of this 
solution. 
Traditionally, shop rights allow employers to sell inventions 
made by employees on company time or with company resources 
only when the invention is related to the employer’s business.140  
 
 138 In Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978) 
the court established that reasonable royalties for patent infringement are determined by 
the facts of each individual case.  Id. at 1159.  Although patent infringement is not 
directly analogous to the issue in Moore, it provides a useful guideline.  Thus, at least 
from the perspective of the Moore case, even a nominal three percent of Golde’s 
compensation from the sale of the resulting cell-line would have netted Moore $13,200 
and 2250 shares of stock in Genetics Institute.  See id. at 1159; Fromson v. Citiplate, Inc., 
699 F. Supp. 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding reasonable royalties of 3.1 to 7.5 percent); 
Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 899 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding reasonable 
royalties of 20 percent). 
 139 See, e.g., Charles J. Hanley, A Case of Good Research or ‘Genetic Colonialism’?; 
Medicine: A Papua New Guinea Tribesman Came Out of the Bush Seeking Help for Ill 
Children.  When His Blood Was Found to Contain Clues to Leukemia, the U.S. Patented 
It, Generating Ethical Questions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1996, at A1 (reporting on a cell-
line developed by NIH researchers from the blood of an indigenous Papua New Guinean.  
The researchers subsequently obtained a U.S. patent for the cell-line.  The tribesman 
whose blood was used to create the invention is not listed as a beneficiary of the patent, 
nor was he aware of the use of his blood, the creation of the cell-line or the grant of the 
patent.) 
 140 See Drechsler, supra note 125, § 39. (“All the authorities agree that the scope of a 
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With cell-line inventions, there is a unique employment 
relationship, and the traditional determination of the employer’s 
“business” cannot be applied.  This poses a unique difficulty for 
applying the shop right doctrine to the doctor-patient relationship.  
The patient-employer’s “business,” his purpose in hiring the 
physician, is “getting well” or staying that way.  The subsequent 
invention by the employee physician will have little, if any, impact 
on this business interest.  It would be tenuous for a court to hold 
that every patient has a business interest in exploiting his own 
body’s potential.  It would be more tenuous still to say that patients 
with no knowledge of their cells’ potential, and no demonstrable 
intention to investigate, nonetheless deserve to be compensated for 
the resulting inventions. 
Most people with potentially patentable cells do not have careers 
in biological-engineering or biotechnology.  Thus, unless courts 
recognize that a desire to profit from one’s bodily tissues is a 
business interest, few future Moores will succeed in holding their 
doctor accountable for profit sharing.  Even if the patient-source 
was professionally involved in biotechnology, there remains the 
hurdle of finding a nexus between the patient’s hiring of the doctor 
and the actual inventive process.141  Other than the unlikely 
situation where a patient hires a physician for the primary purpose 
of capitalizing on preinventions lurking within his body, it is 
improbable that a court would find such an invention to be related 
to the business interests of this employer-employee relationship.  
Nonetheless, as discussed below, there is a significant public 
policy rationale for courts to hold that any invention created from 
human source material is sufficiently related to the business 
interests of that source and gives rise to a shop right in the 
resulting invention. 
Since publication of the Moore case, there has been public 
outcry over the potential exploitation of patients’ tissue without 
proper compensation, or acknowledgment of the source of that 
tissue.142  Rational people now fear that blood taken for one reason 
 
shop right or similar privilege in favor of the employer must be determined from such 
factors as the nature of the employer’s business, the character of the invention involved, 
the circumstances under which it was created, and the relation, conduct, and intention of 
the parties.”). 
 141 Presumably the patient “hires” a doctor to be treated for a medical problem and not 
to capitalize on potentially lucrative preinventions in his blood. 
 142 See generally Karen Wright, The Body Bazaar; The Market in Human Organs Is 
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can be used for unauthorized research and transformed into 
patentable products about which they will not be informed.143  This 
fear represents a fundamental distrust of the medical community, 
which can be broken down into two parts.  First, people fear that 
doctors are increasingly likely to use their patients as living 
experiments, and thus any inventions that may spring from such 
experimentation are morally and ethically objectionable.144  
 
Growing, DISCOVER, Oct. 1998, at 114. 
 143 See Talk of the Nation/Science Friday: Professor Lori Andrews, Professor David 
Cox and Chuck Ludlam Discuss the Current Situation Involving the Patenting of Genetic 
Materials and Sequences (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 29, 1999) (Transcript on file with 
author and available at www.lexis.com).  
Prof. ANDREWS: And right now there are other fallouts.  I mean, 
the Amgen patent on a gene is worth $ 1.5 billion a year.  And so that 
means that we’re turning patients into potential treasure troves.  I 
mean, John Moore, for example, a patient in California, was a target 
of his physician who, without his knowledge or consent, purportedly 
took out his cell-line and patented it.  We’re seeing that all over.  I 
mean, for example, the breast cancer mutation that everybody knows 
about affecting Ashkenazi Jewish women. That was done on blood 
samples that they gave for other reasons without their knowledge or 
consent.  And now information has been developed about Ashkenazi 
Jewish women that might be used to discriminate against them in 
insurance, and so forth. 
Mr. LUDLAM: Well, actually, we’ve. . . 
Prof. ANDREWS: And so we’re not asking consent of patients in 
many situations because the money is just so big and attractive.  They 
are. . . 
Mr. LUDLAM: We’ve worked very hard on the discrimination issue.  
In fact, in the Health Insurance Portability Act in ‘95, our industry 
strongly supported a provision barring discrimination in group health 
insurance based on genetic information. 
Prof. ANDREWS: But your group also. . . 
Mr. LUDLAM: And we had a good deal to do with enacting—that’s 
current law.  Most people don’t know. 
Prof. ANDREWS: Mm-hmm. 
Mr. LUDLAM: We’re now working on medical confidentiality to 
deal with confidentiality of genetic information. 
Prof. ANDREWS: Yeah, but your. . . 
Mr. LUDLAM: We’re very strong believers that you need to prevent 
abuse of this information. 
Prof. ANDREWS: Sure.  Yeah, but your industry also has pushed 
through in state legislatures that did have laws protecting people’s 
right to consent to DNA testing exceptions that allow researchers, 
such as your companies, to have access to people’s blood samples 
without their knowledge or consent. 
Id. 
 144 See, e.g., Kevin O’Sullivan, Dolly’s Maker Advises on Research Use, IRISH TIMES, 
Mar. 16, 1998, at A8 (quoting Irish Green Party politician as saying that biotechnology 
was a “‘genetic assault on society’ with patients exploited by pharmaceutical industry 
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Second, people have a general perception that medical patients are 
being unduly exploited without their input or consent in the name 
of technological progress.145  Failure to address these issues will 
have widespread consequences, including undermining the 
public’s confidence in the patent system and fostering the notion 
that government is unwilling to address the ethical concerns of its 
constituents, and is instead pandering to large biological research 
concerns. 
To address these fears most completely, the medical community 
must be required to obtain consent for all uses of human-derived 
biological material.  Yet, this would be nearly impossible given the 
sheer amount of biological material that would have to be tracked 
and the prohibitive expense of finding the source to obtain 
consent.146  Derived from definite and readily identifiable sources, 
human cell-lines offer a more efficient method of balancing the 
individual’s desire to control the use of his donated cells with the 
preservation of scientific freedom to research.  This would link the 
financial success of the cell-line to the consent of the individual.  
This may be accomplished without legislative effort by eliminating 
the traditionally required nexus between an employee’s invention 
and an employer’s business.  Unless the business nexus 
requirement is eliminated, it is unlikely that a court will order 
equitable division of patent rights between a physician-inventor 
and his patient-employer by operation of the common law shop 
right doctrine alone.147  Some judges might be reluctant to 
 
saying ‘no patents, no cure.’  Ireland was allowing companies to ‘bio-prospect on patients 
for profit’ . . . by facilitating secretive attempts to extract gene sequences.”). 
 145 See, e.g., Elizabeth Pennisi, NRC OKs Long-Delayed Survey of Human Genome 
Diversity, SCIENCE, Oct. 24, 1997, at 568 (noting the fear that “indigenous populations 
would be exploited because researchers might try to patent their DNA for use in medical 
tests or other products without sharing the profits with the original donors”); Nicholas 
Hildyard & Sarah Sexton, No Patents on Life, F. FOR APPLIED RES. & PUB. POL’Y, Mar. 
22, 2000, at 69. 
 146 To put this in perspective, Ameripath, which performs pathology services for only 
170 hospitals, analyzes nearly 3 million tissue biopsies every year.  Under an agreement 
with DNA Sciences, a company that recruits people to donate their DNA to help find 
genes that cause disease, Ameripath will provide them with several hundred thousand of 
its accumulated samples.  See Andrew Pollack, DNA Sought Online: Web Site Recruits 
Donors to Contribute to ‘Gene Trust,’ Assist Disease Research, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
Aug. 1, 2000, at 5D. 
 147 See Dubilier Condenser, 289 U.S. at 187 (“One employed to make an invention, 
who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to 
his employer any patent obtained. . . .  On the other hand, if the employment be general, 
albeit it cover a field of labor and effort in the performance of which he obtained a patent, 
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recognize this concept because the public interest is presently 
rarefied due to the small number of Moore-like cases.148  
Therefore, in order to ensure that cell-line patents transmit shop 
rights to the source of the cells, it would be prudent to find a 
solution to the nexus problem outside of the judicial arena.  One 
promising possibility is contracting for limited rights in any 
inventions resulting from tissue harvesting procedures in the 
preinvention stage.  Preinvention contracts, private agreements to 
disregard some aspects of the common law shop right doctrine, can 
overcome any difficulties inherent in the doctrine.149 
B.  Preinvention Contracts 
A second long-established method of determining rights vesting 
in as-of-yet created inventions is by preinvention contract.150  This 
instrument can obligate the employee to assign to the employer all 
interests in future patentable inventions conceived during the 
employment relationship as a condition of that employment.151  
The scope of such agreements varies, but even the liberal require 
assignment of inventions made by the employee relating to the 
employer’s business or research interests during the employment 
relationship.152  Although the employee is named as inventor on 
 
the contract is not so broadly construed as to require an assignment of the patent.”). 
 148 Regarding property rights in cell-lines, only a few cases have been filed.  See, e.g., 
Moore, 793 P.2d at 479; Miles, Inc. v. Scripps Clinic and Research Found., 810 F. Supp. 
1091 (S.D. Cal. 1993); United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Maryland 1994).  
One other similar case was filed but settled out of court.  In that case researchers patented 
a hybridoma that produced an anti-tumor antibody using cancer cells of the mother of a 
post-doctoral student, Dr. Heideaki Hagiwara.  See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 26. 
 149 For a discussion of preinvention contracts generally, see Steven Cherensky, A 
Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, 
Property, and Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REV. 595 (1993). 
 150 See generally id. 
 151 See Cherensky, supra note 149, at 617-18. 
 152 See id. at 618 n.104.   
Typical preinvention assignment agreements provide: The 
undersigned agrees that he will disclose to the Company all 
inventions, improvements, software, processes, ideas, and 
innovations (hereinafter referred to, for convenience only, as 
“Discoveries”), made or conceived by him, whether or not patentable 
or copyrightable, either solely or in concert with others, and whether 
or not made or conceived during working hours, during the period of 
his employment, which (a) relate to the existing or contemplated 
business or research activities of the Company; (b) result from the 
use of the Company’s proprietary information, facilities, or resources; 
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any patent applications, the employer is named as the assignee, or 
legal owner of all relevant aspects of the patent by operation of the 
agreement.153  This includes the right to exclude others (including, 
in some cases, the employee himself) from making, using, or 
selling the invention throughout the United States for a period of 
twenty years.154  Parties who bargain for “preinvention” rights 
cannot be certain of the value or even the exact subject matter of 
their bargain at the time of contract,155 yet virtually all technical 
employees work under such contracts.156  Preinvention agreements, 
although adhesion contracts, are upheld by virtually all courts on 
the basis of freedom of contract.157  In applying this existing body 
of case law to modern cell-line invention cases, the questions that 
must be answered are: 1) what kind of employee-employer 
relationship must exist in order to have a preinvention agreement 
upheld; 2) what is the duration of a doctor-patient employment 
relationship, and is it sufficient to keep a preinvention agreement 
in force for the length of time necessary to bring a cell-line 
invention to fruition; 3) what consideration must a doctor receive 
to make such an agreement binding; and 4) can a patient contract 
for a partial transfer of rights where they provide no contribution 
other than the source biological material? 
Essentially, any clause in a contract for invention assignment is 
enforceable regardless of the nature or duration of the employment 
relationship, as long as it was not agreed to under duress and is not 
unconscionable.158  Because preinvention contracts are enforceable 
 
or (c) arise out of or result from work performed for the Company. 
[The undersigned acknowledges that he is employed to engage in 
research, design, and development.]  The undersigned further agrees 
to keep full and complete records concerning the development of 
discoveries as above defined and to tender such records to the 
company upon request.). 
Id. 
 153 See 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 22.01, 22.02 (noting that the inventor is the 
presumptive owner of the property rights in a patentable invention, but that he can 
transfer ownership interest by written assignment.  Even if ownership rights are assigned, 
patent law requires the inventor to be named in the application for a patent.) 
 154 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
 155 See Cherensky, supra note 149, at 598. 
 156 See id. at 599. 
 157 Signing a preinvention assignment agreement is an express condition of 
employment, yet an enforceable one, barring any finding of overreaching on the part of 
the employer.  See Cherensky, supra note 149, at 600. 
 158 35 U.S.C. § 261 provides that patents are assignable by law.  The enforceability of 
the resulting “contract of assignment” is then analyzed under general contract principles.  
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so long as they are not unconscionable, it is unlikely that a court 
will make an extended inquiry into the depth of the employment 
relationship.159  Thus, in situations where a preinvention contract 
assigns limited rights in a patent to a patient, the courts do not need 
to determine the degree to which a doctor-patient relationship may 
be equated to a traditional employer-employee relationship.  As to 
the issue of consideration, the simplest way of disposing of this 
issue is to tie the shop right either to the consent to research or to 
the physical transfer of cells from the source to the doctor. 
Introducing a new contractual step in obtaining consent to 
research would, to some degree, increase the cost of medical care.  
More significantly, however, it would raise the informed consent 
burden of physician-researchers.  Physicians would be forced to 
take on the role of informing a patient about the potential value of 
his cells or tissues as well as the pros and cons of having them 
removed for health reasons.  While this appears to be a difficult 
issue to resolve in a doctor’s office, the benefit of the preinvention 
contract approach is that, much like the second medical opinion, a 
patient has the ability to obtain a secondary legal opinion prior to 
consenting to the proposed research.  No extended legal discussion 
need be conducted between the physician and the patient, so long 
as the physician recommends that the patient seek the advice of 
competent counsel.  The issue of informed consent will therefore 
continue to focus primarily on the decision-making process 
surrounding the health reasons a patient should or should not have 
tissue removed.  Assuming the two parties can come to an 
understanding as to how the potential profit rights should be 
distributed, they are free to codify this agreement in a contract with 
whatever provisions may be necessary under the particular 
circumstances.  By separating the medical/research discussion 
from the legal one, the preinvention approach can be adapted to fit 
virtually any medical circumstances in which a doctor wants to 
conduct research on a patient.  This separation interposes a new 
step in the informed consent process. 
It is unlikely there will be a situation wherein the entire informed 
consent and preinvention contractual process must be completed at 
the time of the initial visit to the doctor, even if the need for 
treatment is urgent.  The hypothetical emergency patient can 
 
See, e.g., Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 49, 51 (E.D. La. 1991). 
 159 See Cherensky, supra note 149, at 619-623. 
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simply deny consent for research until such time as he has 
contracted to protect his right to benefit from that research, while 
still consenting to treatment for his emergency condition.160  Thus, 
no patient can be unduly pressured into accepting a less-than-
equitable deal.  Alternatively, the patient might grant the doctor 
provisional consent to store the cells without actually beginning 
research, or consent to research with a prohibition on 
commercializing any results until negotiations have been 
completed to the patient’s satisfaction.  With conditional consent, 
it may be necessary for the court or legislature to intervene to 
assure that the commercialization of the research does not proceed 
without the patient’s express consent.  This would only require a 
court or legislature to make minor changes to expand the existing 
informed consent laws of many states. 
This preinvention contract system, combined with a small 
expansion of informed consent law, would minimize transaction 
costs.  The initial transaction costs would be incurred in the 
expansion of the informed consent procedures.  These procedures 
would be expanded to include a patient’s ability to refuse consent 
to commercialization of their tissue, the recommendation that 
patients seek the advice of a lawyer prior to consenting to such 
commercialization, and the process of familiarizing patients with 
the effect of these new choices.  Once these transaction costs are 
overcome, the only remaining cost would be an explanation of the 
various options that the patient could choose.  These options are 
temporary storage pending later consent to research, research, 
research but no commercialization, or research and 
commercialization. 
The shop right and preinvention contract address the most 
prevalent difficulty with cell-line patents: that by ignoring the 
source of the tissue, they fail to recognize that inventorship can 
have both a passive and an active component.  In other words, by 
cutting the source of the original tissue out of the patent-proper, 
current cell-line ownership arguments fail to acknowledge that 
 
 160 There is the possibility that a physician might want to publish his treatment of the 
patient’s particular medical problem under the rubric of “medical research.”  My 
proposition, however, is accurate with respect to cell-line inventions.  At the time of 
emergency treatment, there is no need to rush a patient into consenting to allow a sample 
of his tissue being taken for the purposes of producing a cell-line.  This is because the 
types of cells he has at the time of treatment are the same as those he will have much 
later. 
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there would be no invention and thus, no patent, without the 
source’s contribution.  The benefit of a patent law approach to the 
allocation of profits between the patent owner and the source of the 
bodily materials is that it does not necessarily require any 
legislative action.  It does, however, require a paradigm shift in the 
doctor-patient relationship from paternalism to something 
approaching parity.  Working within the context of preinvention 
contract litigation, courts will be able to overcome resistance to 
this new paradigm by ratifying these restructured doctor-patient 
relationships. 
CONCLUSION 
The Moore decision raised many novel questions regarding the 
rights of medical research subjects in the world of biotechnology.  
Although the California Supreme Court was willing to expand the 
law of informed consent, it did not resolve the issue of individual 
rights in inventions based on a patient’s discarded tissue.161  The 
failure to acknowledge such rights has contributed to public outcry 
over the ethical issues and financial inequities resulting from the 
assignment of intellectual property rights in living inventions.162  
Although the consent requirement gives the modern medical 
patient some degree of control over the fate of his own bodily 
tissue, this only protects his right to personal autonomy.163  In a 
market-driven biological research paradigm, the research 
participants should be afforded the freedom to control, and profit 
from, the rights in their cells, which are essentially miniature 
representations of their whole being.  By refusing to grant such 
rights, the Moore court undervalued the contributions of research 
participants to the inventive process.  In doing so, the court was 
thereby guilty of that which it accused Moore: stifling medical 
research by destroying the incentives for some of its participants.  
Yet, while the immediate recognition of property rights in all 
excised tissue would provide a solution to the problem articulated 
by Moore, it would ultimately increase the costs for biological 
research and medical care by expanding the administrative and 
actual costs of compensating tissue donors.  Nevertheless, this 
 
 161 See generally Moore, 793 P.2d at 479. 
 162 See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text. 
 163 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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should not preclude the extension of any rights to research 
subjects. 
The patent system provides not only powerful incentives to 
invent, but well-developed solutions to allocate the financial 
rewards that the patented inventions generate.164  By ratifying the 
use of shop rights and preinvention contracts by research subjects, 
courts can grant human sources compensation in proportion to 
their contribution to an invention.  This can be done with only 
minor alterations in the current administration of medical 
treatment.  Recognizing these limited property rights would protect 
individuals’ commercial interest in their bodies when the scientific 
community is profiting from the use of the individuals’ bodily 
materials.  The disadvantages of this system are few, because the 
patent-based solution for apportioning profits from a cell-line 
protects the ability of academic and other not-for-profit research 
institutions to continue their work without fear of litigation. 
If future courts do not resolve the ownership and right-to-profit 
issues, it is likely that public outcry over the inequities of the 
present system will result in a call for legislative action.  Yet, 
legislative action is avoidable.  While Moore broke new ground by 
raising his dispute in the biotechnology arena, he essentially only 
articulated new subjects for an old debate: the proper division of 
rights in intellectual property.  The large body of common law in 
the various fields of intellectual property suggests that courts are 
experienced in arbitrating such disputes within existing statutes.  
Therefore, in order to protect the diverse interests of medical 
researchers and their subjects most effectively, it is the courts that 
should resolve the debate over property rights in human cells by 
adapting the shop right doctrine and preinvention contracts to 
balance the equities involved in this novel iteration of a classic 
debate. 
 
 
 164 The shop right and preinvention contact are two examples of this. 
